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ABSTRACT 
There are several risks in a BOT project. Major critical risks are total project cost and revenue/tollable traffic. 
This paper presents a sensitivity analysis for a BOT project with a real case study varying equity from 10% to 
90%.Traffic and cost are varied ± 20% and financial analysis is carried out with spread sheet, and test results 
are prepared in graphical forms and presented. Total Project Cost (TPC), Net Present Value (NPV) and 
Financial Internal Rate of Return (FIRR) are plotted with various percentages of equity. Linear and non-linear 
graphs are found. FIRR decreases with increasing TPC/Equity, and probability of project risk increases with 
increasing percentage of equity up to 30 % and decreases beyond this value. 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
The global trend toward greater utilization of private 
capital for infrastructure development shows no sign of 
abating. In the United States, twenty states have enabled 
legislation that permits some form of public-private 
initiatives for transportation projects (Reinhardt, 2004). 
Internationally, the Private Finance Initiative (PFI) in 
the United Kingdom is well known, and the use of 
private capital for infrastructure projects has become 
ordinary within emerging economies where financially 
challenged public administrations look toward the 
private sector to develop basic infrastructure (Esty, 
2003). 
Private investment in public infrastructure occurs 
within the Build-Operate-Transfer (BOT) model, where 
a public entity, the government, and a private entity, the 
sponsor, enter into an agreement according to which the 
sponsor is bound to design, build, finance and operate 
an infrastructure project on behalf of the government for 
a predetermined period of time, the concession period. 
At the end of the concession period, the sponsor 
transfers its ownership rights back to the government. 
Typically, the sponsor finances the BOT investment 
through project finance rather than corporate loans 
(Yescombe, 2003); this introduces another active party, 
the lender. Thus, the BOT model becomes a trilateral 
negotiation game with complex interrelationships.  
The critical success factor for a BOT project is the 
efficient and effective allocation of project risks and 
returns among the government, the sponsor and the 
lender. The next section presents a review of the 
available literature. 
 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
During its life cycle, a BOT project is exposed to 
various risks that, if not mitigated, may financially 
distress sponsors and lenders (Yescombe, 2003; Dailami 
et al., 1999). Therefore, before entering into contractual 
arrangements, sponsors and lenders appraise the risks 
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involved in the project very carefully (Hoffman, 2001). 
If they are not comfortable with the level of such risks 
and there are no available alternatives to mitigate them, 
they will likely withdraw from the project. In other 
words, sponsors and lenders finalize the BOT project 
“only if ” the mitigation of the project’s risks improves 
the likelihood that their investment will be profitable. 
Thus, risk management and risk mitigation play a 
central role in the successful realization of BOT 
infrastructure projects. 
Governments may enhance the “marketability” of 
BOT infrastructure projects by offering financial 
support packages to private sector investors (i.e. 
sponsors). These supports have often a dual effect. 
While they augment the investment rate of return of the 
sponsors, they may also improve the credit worthiness 
of the project which ,in turn, permits sponsors to 
negotiate more competitive interest rates with lenders. 
Irwin (2003) describes fiscal instruments that 
governments may provide to sponsors:  
a. Output-based cash subsidies (i.e., cash subsidies 
tied to the provision of certain services); 
b. In-kind grants (e.g., land grant, right-a-way grant,… 
etc.); 
c. Tax breaks (e.g., reduced taxes , “tax holiday”,… 
etc.); 
d. Capital contributions (e.g., public authority 
participates in the BOT equity investment,… etc.); 
e. Guarantee of risks under government’s control (e.g. 
political risk, regulatory risk guarantees,… etc.); 
f. Guarantee of risks not  under governmental control 
(e.g. natural disaster risk, revenue risk,… etc.). 
One of the more significant risks of a BOT project is 
the revenue risk. The revenue risk is the adverse 
possibility that the project cash flows may not be 
sufficient to cover the project costs, to service the debt 
and to generate the sponsor's expected investment rate 
of return. Dailami et al. (1999) differentiate the revenue 
risk into two sub-categories: 
a. Operating cash-flow risk or equity cash flow risk, 
the risk that may negatively affect the sponsor's 
investment rate of return; 
b. Counter party risk, the risk that may negatively 
affect the sponsor's ability to service the debt. 
In general, a successful mitigation of the equity 
cash-flow risk entails the mitigation of the counter party 
risk as well. The latter mitigation occurs because of the 
“cash-flow waterfall system” employed in the BOT 
project finance structure, in which debt service 
payments are due before the sponsor's equity cash flows 
are paid. 
An essential part of the agreement between the 
government and the private contractor is the allocation 
of risk between the parties: that is, when an event occurs 
that influences the cost or quality of the contracted 
service, which party must pay to rectify the situation or, 
alternatively, which party should gain the resulting 
benefits (Arndt, 1999)? Compared with conventional 
delivery methods, there is a higher risk exposure for the 
BOT sponsor because of the following: 
• High front-end development costs, 
• Extensive and lengthy negotiations with the host 
government, 
• Multiparty involvement, 
• Long-term commitment and 
• Equity contribution from the sponsor. 
The high-risk exposure associated with BOT 
projects means that special attention must be paid to 
analyzing and managing risks (Chee and Yeo, 1995). 
Risk in a construction project, however, cannot be 
eliminated, but it can be minimized or transferred from 
one party to another (Kangari, 1995). BOT 
infrastructure projects carry higher-than-traditional 
levels of risk as they typically involve high capital 
outlays, long lead times and long-lived assets with little 
value in alternative use. The identification, analysis and 
allocation of various types of risks are an important 
aspect for the validation of privately promoted 
infrastructure projects (Dias and Ioannou, 1995). On the 
other hand, determining the relative importance of these 
types of risks is very essential for BOT management 
decision makers. The decision makers of construction 
companies should evaluate and rank BOT projects with 
respect to their risk. Therefore, there is an essential need 
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for a tool that uses a risk index (F) to evaluate the 
pending BOT projects. This paper presents the results of 
a study that aims at developing a prototype model for 
evaluating BOT risk. This model provides the risk 
evaluation and risk index (F) determination. This 
procedure was accomplished through the following case 
studies of BOT projects: Plymouth County, Wyatt 
Detention Facility, State Route 91, Dulles Green Way, 
Wijker Tunnel and Indian Power Plant. 
 
Chart 1 shows the BOT main risk areas that can be 
encountered in construction projects. Each main area 
consists of several attributes that build the identity of 
this area. Both BOT risk areas and attributes have been 
categorized and defined in this study phase (Zayed and 
Chang, 2002). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Chart 1: Build operate transfer (BOT) projects main risk areas 
 
There are many risk definitions in construction. 
Jaafari (1990) defined risk as the presence of potential 
or actual constraints that could stand in the way of 
project performance, causing partial or complete failure 
either during construction and commissioning or at the 
time of use. Risk is the exposure to the chance of 
occurrence of events adversely or favorably affecting 
project objectives as a consequence of uncertainty (Al-
Bahar, 1990). Then, risk is the uncertainty of an event, 
potential loss/gain from an event. Dias and Ioannou 
(1995) concluded that there are two types of risk. Pure 
risk exists when there is a possibility of financial loss 
but no possibility of financial gain, for example, 
physical damages; and speculative risk involves the 
possibility of both gain and loss, that is, financial risk 
and production risk. 
Dias and Ioannou (1995) emphasized that project 
financing requires the identification and analysis of risk 
areas during different phases of the project using 
different parameters. Several writers have proposed 
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classification and definition of risk in project financing, 
concluding that the allocation of risks to the parties in 
BOT projects is the key ingredient for successful 
project-financing undertakings. They classified risks 
according to the following BOT project phases: 
 Development phase -technology, credit and bid 
risks; 
 Construction phase -completion, cost overrun, 
performance and political risks; 
 Operating phase -performance, cost overrun, 
liability, equity resale and off-take risks; 
 Ongoing risks -interest rate and currency risks. 
The identification of possible sources of risk is an 
essential area in the risk management process because it 
allows project parties to recognize the existence of 
uncertainty in the project and hence to analyze its potential 
impact and to consider an appropriate strategy to mitigate 
its effect on the project. Dias and Ioannou (1995) have 
classified sources of risk in the following 10 categories: 
country political and regulatory, force majeure, physical, 
financial, revenue, promoting, procurement, 
developmental, construction and operating risks.  
 
Traffic/Revenue Forecast  
In transportation BOT projects, the revenue risk is 
tightly related to the traffic risk, which is the risk that 
the actual traffic volume may be lower than the 
projected value considered in the financial base-case 
analysis. One possibility for mitigating the 
transportation revenue risk is for a government to 
guarantee a specific level of revenue for the sponsor 
during a project’s operation period. Hence, if the actual 
revenue generated by the project falls below the 
guaranteed amount, then the government will finance 
the difference. This type of government guarantee has 
been employed successfully in Asia, Europe and South 
America (Wibowo, 2005; Vassallo and Soliňo, 2006). 
 
Cost Estimate Variations 
The basic cost components of a BOT project are 
construction and maintenance-operating costs. One of 
the causes of construction cost estimate variations is an 
unpredictable situation during the construction of a 
BOT project. Sometimes, it can be caused by natural 
disasters such as floods, storms,… etc. Cost estimate 
variations can also be caused by mistakes such as not 
properly investigating construction requirements of the 
BOT project. Furthermore, poor advanced construction 
planning highly affects cost estimate variations. In 
addition, uncertainty of cost estimate can be caused by 
other events that are difficult to control; for example, 
political turmoil, labor strike and delay in land delivery 
by the host government (Chang, 1992). For the 
maintenance-operating cost variation, its unexpected 
increase can be caused from damages of structure or 
equipment, from some kind of natural disaster or from 
increasing the cost of faulty, poorly installed or 
manufactured equipment. When the construction and 
maintenance-operating costs exceed original estimates, 
this leads to cost overrun risk. The results of inaccurate 
cost estimates definitely lead to an improper assessment 
of the BOT project.  
 
MAJOR FINDINGS 
 
Following major conclusions can be drawn from the 
literature review: 
• BOT project consists of several numbers of risks. 
• The government of a country transfers risk to the 
concessionaire. 
• Major risks are country political and regulatory, 
force majeure, physical, financial, revenue, 
promoting, procurement, developmental, 
construction and operating risks. 
 
OBJECTIVE AND SCOPE OF WORK 
 
The future of a BOT project is uncertain. The 
concessionaire may like to know what will happen to 
the viability of a project when some variables like 
construction cost or revenue deviate from their expected 
values. In other words, the concessionaire may want to 
conduct "what if" analysis or sensitivity analysis. 
These two variables; construction cost and revenue, 
Risk Analysis for…                                                                                         Swapan Kumar Bagui and Ambarish Ghosh 
 
- 334 - 
vary from 0 to ± 20% of the base value determined 
during the preparation of the detailed project 
report/feasibility study report representing the values of 
financial parameters. 
Based on major research works carried out a by 
researchers, the objective of the present work is to carry 
out sensitivity analysis to determine the range of various 
financial parameters like NPV, FIRR and TPC of a BOT 
project.  
 
CASE STUDY 
Traffic 
A case study has been conducted. The traffic study 
has been carried out in December 1999 on a selected 
section of the existing two lanes of NH 4, and growth 
factors of traffic have been established. 
The growth rate has been determined based on the 
following methods: 
• Past trend analysis; 
• Net state domestic product and per capita income; 
• Previous studies. 
Considering all the above-mentioned methods, suitable 
growth factors are established for projected traffic. 
Opening year traffic (Tollable) is shown in Table 1. 
 
Table 1. Base year traffic 
Vehicle Type Number of Vehicles 
Car 6432 
Bus 1734 
Light Commercial Vehicle 1161 
2-Axle Vehicle 1148 
3-Axle Vehicle 579 
Multi-Axle Vehicle 2158 
 
Induced and Generated Traffic 
After the improvement of the existing facility, traffic 
of other roads may be attracted to improved roads for 
better road geometry, riding quality, less travel time, 
shorter distance… etc. Existing traffic may be capable 
to generate more trip due to less travel time/increasing 
travel speed for the upgrading of the road. This traffic is 
assumed to be 5% of the traffic at the time of opening. 
Year 2004 is the year of opening. Traffic is obtained by 
multiplying the projected 2004 traffic by 1.05, and the 
numbers of vehicles according to vehicle type are 
shown in Table 1. Tollable traffic is determined based 
on growth rate factor 0.05 for all vehicles as mentioned 
in MCA Guide line. 
 
Toll Rate 
Toll rate has been selected using guidelines prepared 
by the Government of India. Inflation rate has been 
determined based on the Reserve Bank of India Bulletin 
(2000). Whole Price Index (WPI) for all commodities 
had an average value of 8.3 %. 
Using this value, the future toll rate has been 
projected. Toll rates for the opening year, 2004, and for 
the year 1997 are mentioned in Table 2. Toll rate 
increasing factor for the year 2004 is 1.0837=1.74. 
 
Project Cost  
The project road is 15.1 km long. The project cost 
was worked out and found to be 50 million Rs per km 
(2000 costing) as base cost. Total Project Cost (TPC) 
was calculated as follows: 
 
TPC=Base cost + Interest of debt during 
construction + Inflation during construction 
period… (1) 
 
TPC has been calculated varying the equity from 
10% to 90 %  and varying the base cost by  ± 20%. TPC 
for various cases is shown in Fig. 1. 
 
Concession Period 
Concession period is taken 25 years. 
 
Financial Analysis 
Financial analysis has been carried out taking the 
following major cost components into account: 
• Project Cost (50 million Rs per km); 
• Annual Routine Maintenance Cost (repair of pot 
hole, clearing C D structure,… etc) (0.21 million Rs 
per km); 
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• Periodic Maintenance Cost (thin overlay every 3 to 
5 years) (2.85 million Rs per km); 
• Toll Operation Cost (toll administrative cost) (6.1 
million Rs for toll plaza). 
 
Table 2. Toll rate /km vehicle-wise 
 
Year Car Full Bus Multi-Axle LCV 2A-,3A- Truck 
Toll Rate Rs (1997) 0.40 1.40 3.00 0.70 1.40 
Toll Rate Rs (2004)* 0.69 2.40 5.20 1.20 240 
 
Note: Toll rate for the year 2004 is obtained by multiplying the toll rate for the year 1997 by 1.74 
 
RISK ANALYSIS 
 
The variation of base cost and base traffic for the 
sensitivity analysis is shown in Table (3). 
 
Table 3. Variation of Base Cost and Traffic for 
Sensitivity Analysis 
Base Cost Increase by 20% Decrease by 20% 
Base Traffic Increase by 20% Decrease by 20% 
Financial analysis has been carried out considering 
various combinations of cost and traffic. Final results 
are shown in graphical forms (See Figs. 1-11). 
 
Results of Financial Analysis 
Total transportation cost is shown in Fig 1. From 
Fig. 1, it is found that TPC increases with decreasing the 
percentage of equity. This is due to adding interest of 
debt in TPC.TPC varies linearly with a negative slope. 
 
 
 
Figure 1: Variation of TPC for various cases with different percentages of equity 
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Figure 2: Variation of NPV with equity for base traffic 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3: Variation of FIRR with equity for base traffic 
 
Jordan Journal of Civil Engineering, Volume 5, No. 3, 2011 
 
- 337 - 
 
Figure 4: Variation of FIRR with 20 % increase of base traffic 
 
 
  
 
Figure 5: Variation of NPV with 20% increase of base traffic 
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Figure 6: Variation of FIRR with 20% decrease of base traffic 
 
 
 
 
Figure 7: Variation of NPV with 20% decrease of base traffic 
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Figure 8: Variation of FIRR and TPC for base case 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 9: Probability of NPV< 0 for base cost and base traffic 
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Figure 10: Variation of NPV (equity) for various debt equity ratios for base cost and 20% 
increase of base traffic 
 
NPV and FIRR for various percentages of equity for 
base traffic with varying cost of the project are shown in 
Fig. 2 and Fig. 3, respectively. NPV and FIRR vary 
linearly with positive and negative slopes, respectively, 
for the case of base traffic. 
FIRR and NPV for various percentages of equity for 
a 20% increase of base traffic with varying equity 
percentages are shown in Fig. 4 and Fig. 5, respectively. 
FIRR varies non-linearly (second degree equation) with 
a negative slope and NPV varies linearly with a positive 
slope. 
FIRR and NPV for various percentages of equity for 
a 20% decrease of base traffic with varying equity 
percentages are shown in Fig. 6 and Fig. 7, respectively. 
FIRR varies non-linearly (second degree equation) with 
a negative slope and NPV varies linearly with a positive 
slope. 
Fig. 8 shows the variation of FIRR and TPC for the 
base case. FIRR varies non-linearly (second degree 
equation) with a positive slope. FIRR increases with 
increasing TPC. 
Fig. 9 shows the probability of NPV < 0 for base 
cost and base traffic. It is found from this figure that the 
probability of NPV <0 increases with increasing the 
percentage of equity up to 30%, and beyond 30% of 
equity the probability of NPV <0 decreases. Maximum 
risk is found at 30% equity. 
Fig. 10 shows the variation of NPV of equity during 
the operation period for various debt equity ratios. NPV 
is lower at higher debt equity ratios for the base case.  
Fig. 11 shows the variation of FIRR (equity) for 
various debt equity  ratios  for  the base case. From this 
Jordan Journal of Civil Engineering, Volume 5, No. 3, 2011 
 
- 341 - 
 
 
Figure 11: Variation of FIRR (equity) for different concession periods and various debt equity ratios for 
base cost and 20% increase of base traffic 
 
figure, it is found that FIRR is highest at highest debt 
equity ratio. 
Similar figures can be drawn for NPV and FIRR 
varying project cost and traffic for sensitivity analysis. 
 
CONCLUSIONS 
 
Sensitivity analysis may be carried out to determine 
the uncertainty of a project. Similar graphs/figures may 
be developed to study various financial parameters like 
financial internal rate of return (FIRR) and net present 
value (NPV) and measure the risk of the project. The 
following conclusions may be drawn from the present 
study. 
• Total project cost, financial internal rate of return 
and net present value vary linearly with a negative 
slope for the base case. 
• FIRR varies non-linearly (second degree equation) 
with a negative slope, and NPV varies linearly with 
a negative slope for the case of 20% increase of 
base traffic as well as for the case of 20% decrease 
of base traffic. 
• FIRR increases with increasing total project cost 
(TPC) forn the base case. 
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• Probability of NPV <0 increases with increasing the 
percentage of equity up to 30%, and beyond 30% of 
equity the probability of NPV<0 decreases. 
Maximum risk is found at 30% equity. 
• NPV is lower at higher debt equity ratios for the 
base case.  
• FIRR is highest at highest debt equity ratios for the 
base case. 
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